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ABSTRACT: Despite the fact that there are similar trajectories and turning points
between Finland’s and other European countries’ responses to the Holocaust, it
is still the case that trends in Holocaust studies and key debates within the field
have had less impact on Finnish understanding of the Holocaust than one might
suspect. Instead, as this article examines, the way in which Finland’s Holocaust
awareness has been developing since the end of the war in general, and in the
2000s in particular, has been intimately linked with the Finnish understanding
of its own role in WWII. This tendency was most clearly illustrated in the
controversy that took place during 2003 and 2004 with the publication of Elina
Sana’s book Luovutetut [The Extradited].
RÉSUMÉ : Malgré le fait qu’il existe des trajectoires et points-clés similaires entre
la réponse de la Finlande et les réponses des autres pays européens à l’Holocauste,
elle demeure le cas en vogue dans les études de l’Holocauste, et les débats-clés
au sein de ce champ d’études ont eu moins d’impact sur la compréhension
finlandaise de l’Holocauste que l’on pourrait le soupçonner. À la place, tel que
l’examine cet article, la façon dont s’est développée la conscience finlandaise de
l’Holocauste depuis la fin de la guerre en général, et dans les années 2000, en
particulier, a été intimement liée à la compréhension finlandaise de son propre
rôle dans la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Cette tendance a été le plus clairement
illustrée dans la controverse qui a eu lieu en 2003 et 2004, avec la publication du
livre d’Elina Sana Luovutetut [Les extradés].
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Introduction
I t is by now widely accepted that the end of the Cold War initiated a newphase in Holocaust historiography. The archives in the former Soviet Blocopened possibilities to re-assess the importance of the East in the historiesof the Holocaust. Further, the collapse of the Cold War world order has
“meant that suppressed questions concerning collaboration, resistance and the
true impact ofNazismand the SecondWorldWar are nowbeing addressed” (Stone
1). This general trend,with the inclusion of the boom inmemory studies in general
and post-Holocaust memory and its representation in particular, has also been
prevalent in the Scandinavian context—including Finland (Holmila and Kvist
Geverts 521). However, as we will see, the way in which Finland’s Holocaust
awareness has been developed since the 1990s has been intimately linked with
the Finnish understanding of its own role in WWII. Conversely, then, trends in
Holocaust studies and key debateswithin thefield have had less impact on Finnish
understanding of the Holocaust than one might suspect. Having said that is not
to argue that the Finnish case would be somehow different or exceptional to
European developments. Rather, there are similar trajectories and turning
points—such as NBC’s miniseries The Holocaust (1979)—but if one wants to
understand Finland’s responses to the Holocaust, it cannot be removed from the
context of Finland’s responses and views of WWII, as will be discussed below.
The Contexts of WWII: The Separate War Thesis and the
Driftwood Debate
Ever since 1941 when Finland joined its military force with Nazi Germany,
the nature of the alliance has been difficult for Finns to accept. Even during the
war itself, Finnish leaders were at pains to explain the nature of comradeship
with Hitler’s Germany. Given the geopolitical situation, Germany was the only
European power that could offer any kind of security against Finland’s nemesis,
theUSSR. The Finns felt, quite rightly, that the Soviet Union presented an ongoing
threat for Finnish sovereignty, and by 1941 the only way to balance the Soviet
threat was to throw in its lot with the Nazis. To justify the alliance, the so-called
“separate war thesis” was formulated. Primarily, it was developed for domestic
purposes: its main function was to justify for the majority of Finns, soldiers, and
civilians why Finland was cobelligerent with the Nazis. Secondarily, the thesis
also had a foreign policy function. While Finland was co-belligerent with the
Nazis, the Finnish politicians had to take into account the West’s opinion and
present Finland as ideologically part of the Western democratic family. As
President Risto Ryti explained to an American journalist Henry J. Taylor in 1941:
“Finland is waging its separate war and our army will not march further than a
prearrangeddefensive line” (Vilkuna75).1 Essentially, the thesis held that Finland’s
war effort was purely a question of national survival and, as such, a defensive
one; Finland fought against the Soviet Union in its own theatre of war in
conjunction with Nazi Germany but not subordinated to it or its foreign policy
goals. The war was seen as a continuation to the Winter War (1939-1940) and as
such separate from the wider European war. Further, as one of the leading
academic architects of the separate war thesis in the immediate postwar era,
professor Arvi Korhonen, wrote in 1949, “Germany could not afford to force
Finland to lose its attitude [of separate war]” (612), thereby implying that even
the Germans recognized and respected Finland’s separate war.
However, the idea of separate war was contradictory from the
beginning—even if Finlandhadno other viable political option than to align itself
with Germany—not least since in Lapland the Finnish army was conducting its
operations together with the German 6th Army, which controlled the theatre of
operations in the northern part of Finland. Also, in terms of Finland’s food, fuel,
andmaterial supplies, the country was heavily dependent on German assistance.
Despite these factors, throughout the war and in its aftermath Finnish political
elite emphasized the separate nature of Finland’s war effort. The idea—although
not accepted by theWest—was to tell the world that Finland was not in the same
sphere as German satellites. In contrast, the country was similar to other
democratic nations, and its government was neither fascist nor dictatorial. In
many ways, for the interests of national survival, the Finns operated in the same
fashion as theWestern allies.Whereas theUSA andBritain allied themselveswith
Stalin, fully aware of the nature of the Soviet regime, Finland followed the same
logic but on the other side of the table. The historicalmission of Finland, as it was
already seen in the Winter War, was to defend Western values against the
Bolshevik onslaught. Finally, in the postwar era the separate war thesis sought
to mitigate the questions of war crimes and participation in Nazi Germany’s war
of extermination, including the Holocaust.
In terms of memory production of Finland’s role inWWII in the first decade
after the war, the leading Finnish politicians led the way. In the so-called Finnish
War Guilt Trials eight wartime politicians were put on trial for initiating an
aggressivewar against theUSSR. Thedefence speeches of thepoliticians, especially
the wartime president Risto Ryti, gained wide publicity as all major newspapers
discussed it (Kinnunen and Jokisipilä 440-441). In terms of content, Ryti and others
set the paradigmatic interpretation of Finland's role in the war as a separate war
from Hitler’s. The influx of memoirs by the same political elite, the pinnacle of
which was the 1951 memoir of the wartime Chief of Finnish Military, Marshal
Mannerheim, cemented the separate war thesis as the dogmatic interpretation,
which has many echoes even in the 21st century. For example, in 2005 Finnish
President Tarja Halonen caused a stir when she claimed at the French Institute
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of International Relations (Institute francais des relations internationals, IFRI), that
“for us the World War meant a separate war against the Soviet Union and we did
not incur any debt of gratitude to others” (Halonen 2005). The debate that was
sparked by the Presidentwent on formonths andproved that the term still carried
political and psychological weight 60 years after the war. When the Finnish
afternoon paper Ilta-Sanomat asked its readers a few days after the Halonen
incident if Finland fought a separatewar from theNazis inWWII, it received 6,376
replies. Seventy-two percent of the respondents held the view that Finland’s war
was indeed separate (Jokisipilä 2007, 156).
If Finland'swarwas seen as so separate fromNazi Germany’s, then the logical
question that follows is how and why did Finland find itself at war with Nazi
Germany against the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941? Coinciding with the
separatewar thesiswas the so-called “driftwooddebate,”which froman analytical
standpoint also originated from the War Guilt Trials of 1945-1946. However, the
debate about the way in which Finland drifted into the war began in the late
1950s.
With the exception of a group ofminor, mainly Communist newspapers, the
actual public debate started only in 1957 when an American academic, Charles
Lundin, published his book Finland in the Second World War in reaction to Finnish
accounts of the political background of the war. Lundin argued that Finnish
leaders had shown poor political judgment in provoking unease in the Soviet
Union during the interwar era and in choosing to allywithNazi Germany (Lundin
194, 196-222). Lundin’s book was seen in Finland as inaccurate and moralizing;
when Lundin gave a lecture in Helsinki some of the audience, including Edwin
Linkomies (the Prime Minister in 1943–44), walked out.2
Lundin’s book and the public debate surrounding the topic provoked Arvi
Korhonen, a professor and a former army officer, to launch a scholarly
counterattack in Barbarossa-suunnitelma ja Suomi [TheBarbarossa Plan and Finland]
published in 1961. The emergence of newmaterial (in part from Lundin) made it
impossible to continue to deny that Finland had had alternatives to the German
alliance. Yet for exactly this reason it became imperative to assert Finland’s
fundamental powerlessness; Korhonen claimed that the Germans had taken
advantage of the situation anddragged Finland intowar and concluded by quoting
German Ambassador to Helsinki Wipert von Blücher: “Finland was thrown into
the swirl of power politics like a piece of driftwood carried by a surging stream”
(von Blücher 237). An image drawn from a wartime memoir swiftly became a
defining political and epistemological metaphor. Finland had no real political
agency, but it was an object at the mercy of the great power politics.
Nonetheless, Lundin’s line was reiterated throughout the latter half of the
1960s in new interpretations by Anthony Upton inFinland in Crisis 1940–1941 and
by Hans Peter Krosby in Suomen valinta 1941 [Finland’s Choice of 1941]. For Upton,
most of the Finnish explanations were too deterministic; he emphasized that
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even small nations can and have to make choices. Drawing mainly on German
documents, Krosby’s work, for its part, claimed that Finland’s driftwas voluntary,
a purposeful alignmentwith Germany in the unavoidably strong current ofWWII.
Krosby criticized Finnish historiography as well, seeing it as selective and bent
on a patriotic interpretation; for him, if a Finnish memoir and a German official
document contradicted each other, Finnish historians usually decided that the
German version presented an inaccurate view (Krosby 9-11, 15-23).
Krosby’s and Upton’s political andmoral criticismwas attacked furiously by
Finnish politicians and historians. Heated debate of the Continuation War was
part of everyday politics in the 1960s, a debate about events in which many of
the discussants had been actively involved. Themost obvious link to state politics
was President Urho Kekkonen’s use of a critical interpretation of the war to
support his foreign policy, in which friendly relationswith the Soviet Unionwere
paramount. Kekkonen agreed with Upton that representatives of small nations
have often tried to hide behind their smallness in order to disclaim responsibility;
indeed, Kekkonen developed this policy to such an extreme that he warranted
the concept known as Finnlandisierung [Finlandization].3 This notion, referring
to the influence of the Soviet Union on Finland’s policies, resulted in public
self-control, self-censorship, and the promulgation of pro-Soviet attitudes, while
claiming a distinct, formal independence (Vihavainen 33, 41).
At the beginning of the 1970s Colonel Keijo Mikola introduced a slight
modification to the theory: the riverboat metaphor. The riverboat preserved the
general idea of Finland as a vessel almost completely at the mercy of powers
comparable to forces of nature; yet, in implying a modest ability to steer, the
riverboat reflects the impact of new research by historians, political scientists,
and even philosophers, critically considering not only whether the war could
have been avoided but also how Finlandmight have acted differently (Soikkanen
38). Later, in 1987, the historianMauno Jokipii publishedhismonumental research
in which he presented a detailed analysis of the Continuation War and showed
irrefutably how Finland willingly went along with Germany, partly due to the
necessities of the political situation and partly in order to regain the territories
lost in the Winter War.
The fall of the Soviet empire in 1991 produced yet another extensive revision
and re-evaluation of history as the real and imagined political restraints on
discussion of the subjectwere finally removed. The end of Finlandization, though,
led to a burst of nationalistic and patriotic emotions that had been constrained
for decades, which affected historical research as well as practices of
commemoration, political rhetoric, literature, and forms of popular culture,
movies, and plays. In addition, wartime leaders such as President Risto Ryti, who
had been sent to prison after the war, were rehabilitated by cultural and official
measures, often by claiming that they had been innocent victims of the Soviet-led
Allied Control Commission and the politicalmachinations of Finnish Communists.
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Now “the defensive victory of 1944” became the defining moment of the war:
Finland had heroically prevented the Soviet Union from marching to Helsinki,
and consequently it was Finland that had successfully protectedWestern Europe
against Bolshevism. In practice this meant a return to the arguments formulated
to defend Finland’s wartime leaders during the War Guilt Trials.
Since the 1990s, the emphasis in popular debate has returned closer to a
patriotic interpretation of history. Consequently, there is a wide gulf between
critical academichistoriographyandpopular spheres of history culture concerning
the Continuation War, the separate war thesis, and—ultimately—Finland’s role
in the Holocaust. For example, when Markku Jokisipilä criticized the separate
war thesis in 2004, a fierce debate followed. In addition, President Halonen’s
aforementioned speech was criticized by Russian officials and among domestic
researchers (Jokisipilä 2007, 153-160). Professor Henrik Meinander, for example,
found that recent research at the beginning of the 21st century had shown that
Finland’s co-operation with, as well as dependence on, Germany renders it
impossible to use the concept of a “separate”war;Meinander also demanded that
thewar should be assessed in relation to the entire European situation (“Professori
hautaisi” C4; Mäkinen C1).4
The Era of Calm: Finland and Holocaust Memory from the 1940s
to 1980s
When thinking about the Holocaust from a Finnish perspective, it was—for
a long time—considered as an “alien” or “un-Finnish” theme in Finnish
historiography. The dominance of the separate war thesis as the interpretative
framework meant that the Holocaust was seen as purely a German matter out of
Finland’s historical experience. Even the extradition of eight refugee Jews from
Finland to German hands was described as a littlemishap on the part of Finland’s
Minister of Interior, Toivo Horelli, and not as a government policy. Further, the
first generation of Finnish historiography argued that even the Germans did not
consider the extradition of Jews within the framework of the Holocaust: “viewed
from the German perspective the question [of handing over the Jews] was not
about Endlösung but about the deal between the [German] criminal police and
Anthoni [the head of Finnish State Police, Valpo]” (Polvinen 189). In essence,
Finnish historiography—and culture—explained it as a German affair, and thus
the Finnish attitude remained unproblematic and straightforward (Holmila and
Silvennoinen 607). As in the grander scheme of issues, Finland had very little of
its own political agency in the matter. The attitude as described above was
established in the war’s wake, after 1945, when the press began to cover the
liberation of the Nazi concentration camps and the International Military
Tribunal’s proceedings against the major German war criminals at the so-called
Nuremberg Trials. The Finnish press had no trouble writing about the sessions
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in which the fate of Jews was scrutinized—after all, it was a German affair.
However, oblivion and awkwardness set inwhen the context of criminalitymoved
from German soil to Finland (Holmila 528). Most notably, between 1947 and 1948
in the trial of Arno Anthoni, the Finnish court did not recognize, or deliberately
ruled-out, the premise of international law. Tellingly, the defence claimed in the
closing speech that
the only thing that might prove Anthoni’s guilt is that he has committed a crime
against humanity, a crime that is not recognized in our domestic jurisdiction…
despite the defence’s hard effort, they have not been able to prove that as a result
of the extradition any Jews had lost their lives.
(Sana 1979, 267)
Thus, as the court’s rulingmade clear, Finland’swartime record and theHolocaust
were separate entities. In terms of legal battles over the Holocaust’s
representation, it is interesting to note that the landmark case, the Eichmann
trial, which was intensely followed and debated in Europe and the USA, did not
elicit great interest in Finland. For example, when Eichmann appeared in the
Finnish media, such as the leading weekly magazine Suomen kuvalehti, the story
focused on his role of hidingNazi gold, counterfeit British pounds, and someNazi
documents at the end of the war. The Nazi documents in question had nothing
to do with the Holocaust either, but, as the story repeatedly mentioned, they
were believed to disclose the European-wide network of Nazi collaborationists
(Kringelbach 1961a; 1961b; 1961c; Holmila 534).
Hollywood-driven gossip also dominated the release of the film version of
The Diary of Anne Frank in 1959 (Stevens). Rather than the grim subject matter,
the writing about the film (which received three Academy Awards) focused on
the fact that Millie Perkins, the actress who played Anne Frank, had no previous
acting experience, but she had nevertheless beaten established film stars Audrey
Hepburn and Susan Strasberg for the leadingpart (“Elokuva-aiten tähtikokoelma,”
1959, 27).
As has been shown above, the Holocaust appeared in Finnish historical
culture and in popular culture from time to time. However, it was not until the
late 1970s when the Holocaust started to take root in Finnish historical
consciousness. Yet changes in historical consciousness took awhile to take effect,
and until the late 1970s the Holocaust still remained a marginal topic in Finland.
For example, high school-level history textbooks in the 1970s mentioned the
event on an average of two sentences in total (Ikonen 14).
If there are turning points in Finland’s recognition of the Holocaust and its
implications, 1979 is one of them. First, in the spring of 1979 the Finnish
commercial TV channel Mainostelevisio broadcast NBC’s television miniseries
Holocaust: The Story of the Family Weiss. Second, later on in the year Elina Sana’s
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(she was writing under her maiden name Suominen) documentary-scholarly
work, which detailed the extradition/deportation of eight foreign Jews from
Finland into the hands of the Gestapo, was published. Both topics brought the
treatment of Jews into the Finnish historical scene, forcing the issue to be
considered in public. However, in keeping with hegemonic postwar narratives,
the argumentation about Finland’s role in the Final Solution was often defensive
and in some cases belittled the Holocaust. In essence, the horrors that the
miniseries mediated were quickly diluted by using a strategy that could never
fail: comparing the numbers of the Holocaust’s victims to the number of Stalin’s
victims.
In a sense, like the conservative Germanhistorical elite in theHistorikerstreit,
Finnish conservative elite played down the horrific nature of Nazism. Rather than
revealing the unpleasant excesses of Finland’s former co-belligerent, the
Conservative popular historian Sampo Ahto offered a simple and “correct”
historicization of the past:
More importantly than to hate, it would be to ask why our century has become a
century of violence. How is it possible that the Nazis murdered five million Jews,
that after the war at least 2.4 million Germans were murdered, that between
1937–1938 Stalin killed 7–8 million, but possibly 23 million of his own citizens.
(56)
This line of argumentation reveals the dominant Finnish approach to World War
Two: the relationship with and the crimes of the USSR, the old archenemy, was
the dominant point of reference againstwhich all othermatterswere relativized.
The Finns were confronted with their own relationship with the Final
Solution when Elina Sana’s Kuoleman laiva S/S Hohenhörn [The Ship of Death S/S
Hohenhörn] was published in 1979. Anticipating a sensation, Suomen Kuvalehti
ran an interviewwith a young reporter-researcher. Echoing the opinions of Elina
Sana, the articlewas a direct accusation ofwartime political leaders for “adopting
the samepolicies as German-occupied countries did.” (Ruokanen 52) The headline
of the article made the point: “Archives Destroyed, the Guilty Ones Run Away.
New Research Proves That Finland Was Ready to Deport Jews” (Ruokanen 52).
Responses to Elina Sana’s work were diverse. Most of the historical elite
severely criticized her work, while the public reception was more enthusiastic.
For the professional historical cadres the main bone of contention was Sana’s
inability to solidly build her case on documentary evidence. To this end, Professor
Yrjö Blomstedt argued:
The shadows of the extermination camps also reach Finland and the fate of those
eight extradited is full of human tragedy. But from there it is still a long way to
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the idea launched by Sana that Arno Anthoni would have been Adolf Eichmann’s
henchman in Finland.
(146)
Although Sana overstated Anthoni’s importance for the Germans, the way in
which Blomstedt compared Anthoni and Eichmann effectively blurred the grey
zone evenmore regarding Finnish-Germanpolice collaboration. Another strategy
with which conservative history circles sought to limit the impact of Sana’s work
was the claim that the details she brought up were nothing new but had been
known in academia and among the well-informed public for decades (Blomstedt
141).
Historians had indeed referred to the extradition, but Sana’s work was the
first one that subjected the matter to an in-depth analysis. However, many
historians criticized her for poor source criticism and taking the sources at face
value. Although some of the criticism was justified—for example, the omission
of any footnotes or endnotes—the validity of Sana’s work was only examined in
reference to archival sourcematerial in Finland. This, again, is telling of themodus
operandi of professional Finnish historical culture at the time, for Sana’sworkwas
in no small part a result of oral history (she had interviewed everyone she could
find who was involved in the affair) and conducted extensive archival work in
Germany, Switzerland, Poland, and Israel. On the whole, however, the fact that
the public wasmore receptive towards Sana’s work shows that the interest in the
Holocaust and especially Finland’s participation in it was increasing—not least
due to the television seriesHolocaust, which also served as a reference pointwhile
debating Sana’s study (Blomstedt 142).
In the 1980s and 1990s, when the Holocaust was becoming a hot historical
topic globally, there was little said or written about it in Finland. Sana’s book
sparked interest in the topic in academic circles, and two studies about Finland
and the extradition of Jews were published, but they did not elicit discussions
about the topic beyond limited academic circles: Taimi Torvinen’s Pakolaiset
Suomessa Hitlerin valtakaudella [Refugees in Finland during Hitler’s Reign] and
Hannu Rautkallio’s Ne Kahdeksan ja Suomen omatunto: Suomesta 1942 luovutetut
juutalaispakolaiset [Those Eight and Finland’s Consciousness: The Jewish Refugees
and the Extradition from Finland in 1942]. Similarly, the landmark popular
representation of the Holocaust in the 1990s, Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List,
was not discussed in Finland as “a Holocaust topic.” The most cynical voices
thought that Spielberg had chosen such a melodramatic topic for the simple
reason of having a chance to win an Oscar (Holmila 551).
Finnish sociologist Mika Hannula summed up the Finnish historical culture
in 1997 in relation to his discussion of Norbert Elias’ work on the Germans’
struggles to come to termswith the Nazi past. According to him, dealingwith the
national traumas was not only a German issue, but all nations, including Finland,
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had to face the darker epochs in nations’ historical records. According toHannula,
Finland’smost troubling historical episodes “could be found in the events of 1918
and in the 1970s period of Finlandization” (Hannula C7). However, as the new
millenniumwas approaching, thingswere about to begin to change, and ten years
afterHannula’s comment a similar type of assessmentwouldhave been impossible
without a reference to Finland’s darker side in WWII.
The Extradited and a Change of Paradigm5
Upon its publication in 2003, Elina Sana’s Luovutetut: Suomen ihmisluovutukset
Gestapolle [The Extradited: Finland’s Human Deliveries to the Gestapo] aroused a
pointed controversy in Finland. Challenging the official figure of eight Jewish
refugees handed over to the German authorities, Sana claimed that during the
German-Finnish alliance, the Continuation War (1941–1944), Finland extradited
almost 3,000 civilians and POWs, among them approximately 100 Jews. These
extraditions were carried out in cooperation with the Gestapo, even though the
discriminatory treatment of the Jewish community in the territories of the Third
Reich was known by the Finnish authorities. Despite these human deliveries,
however, in the aftermath ofWWII Finland claimed a non-existing or insignificant
role in the Holocaust, asserting it had remained a state governed by the rule of
law with respect for human rights. Sana’s book dramatized the politics
undergirding the research establishment and its alleged objectivity, also showing
the extent to which academic historiography had been, if not explicitly
legitimizing, at least closely related to state politics, not least through its reliance
on access to official documentary sources.
Elina Sana’s “documentary book” proposed two different lines of contact
between the Finnish and German authorities, especially between the secret state
police and the military. The secret police extradited 129 people on a total of 13
occasions to the German authorities; the largest group comprised 99 individuals,
all citizens of the Soviet Union.6 After combining and cross-checking preserved
documents from different archives, Sana concluded that between 1941 and 1944
the Finnish military extradited at least 2,829 POWs to Germany on 49 occasions;
among the military extraditions were over 500 individuals who were defined as
“Jewish” or “political” (i.e. Communist), or both (Sana 2003, 293, 350–353).
Sana concluded that Finland had extradited some 3,000 persons to Germany
during the Continuation War. This enlarged the earlier known number of eight
civilian Jewish refugees deported from Finland (via Tallinn) to Germany on the
S/S Hohenhörn in 1942, a figure based on her earlier studies. According to Sana,
Finnish authorities knew that Germany was particularly interested in Jews and
Communists. Given this awareness, the pragmatic reasons for securing resources
for the Finns are inseparable from ideological compliance because racially- and
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ideologically-conditioned groups of people could be used to secure valuable
resources from Germany, such as grain and oil.
The spark that ignited the 2003 debate was Sana’s suggestion that Finland
had extradited POWs and refugees to Germany on racial grounds. However, Sana
herself repeatedly stressed that her purpose was not to force Holocaust guilt on
Finland by equating Finnish officials with their Nazi colleagues (L. Kekkonen 53;
Kotkamaa12).What shewanted to dowas point out that Finlanddid systematically
extradite and deport Communists, Jews, and other groups labeled as possible
threats to the nation and that these actions needed more attention and research
than they had so far received. Directly challenging the “driftwood” thesis, The
Extradited resurrected a crucial question: had the cooperation between Finnish
andGermanofficials been so close thatwhat Sanadescribed couldhavehappened?
(Kahan 14; Editorial 2).
The internationalmedia and a request onNovember 18, 2003 from the Simon
Wiesenthal Centre to the President of Finland, Tarja Halonen, to investigate the
matter amplified attention to Sana’s claims. The Finnish government reacted
swiftly, appointing Professor Heikki Ylikangas to examine Sana’s results and
consider how more thorough research on the extraditions should be carried out
(SimonWiesenthal Centre 2003; Pärssinen 2003a, 14; 2003b, 2; “Hallitus selvittää,”
10). In December 2003 The Extradited was nominated by The Finnish Book
Foundation for the 2004 Finlandia Literary Prize for Non-Fiction
(“Tieto-Finlandia”), and it won the prize. Ylikangas’s report in January 2004 drew
considerable media attention, as did the acknowledgment of the report by the
Wiesenthal Centre. While it was publicly recognized that the report did not find
conclusive evidence of racially-motivated extraditions (Pohjonen 14; Jaakkonen
8), the report led to a government-funded project, Finland, POWs, and PeopleHanded
Over to Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939–55;7 the prize-giving ceremony and the
publication of the report marked the decline of the debate in the mainstream
media. The results of the project itself did not receive similar media attention,
although collaborative publications, such as Oula Silvennoinen’s 2008 dissertation
about the cooperation between the Finnish State Police and the German RSHA in
northern Finland, did gain recognition domestically and internationally. What is
clear from this national and international controversy is that The Extradited did
considerablymore than rectify the numbers of the extradited. It forced a difficult,
wider act of political history revision.
According to Sana, her original purpose was to alter Finnish
self-understandingby changing the Finnish collectivememoryof theContinuation
War, since “Finland’s role in the Holocaust was much larger than has so far been
admitted” (Hämäläinen D3). As her research progressed, her focus moved from
Jewishness and antisemitism to anti-Communism, and thus the starting-point of
the book is that political criteria could have been the decisive factor in both police
andmilitary policy. If Finland, then, was a co-perpetrator of the Holocaust, it was
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for political reasons (Sana 2003, 19). Sana claimed that Finland was exceedingly
pragmatic when it decided the fates of those who had been taken prisoner or
those who were trying to seek refuge. Communism seemed to provide an excuse
for not recognizing that handing over these people to the Gestapo was a deliberate
death sentence, since unofficial information about the true nature of Nazi
concentration camps was spreading relatively quickly around Europe, as Sana
had argued in her previous research on the topic. If a POW was categorized as a
Jew and a Communist, he could be certain of his fate.
Sana said that presenting the Winter War as a heroic battle against evil is
relatively easy, but explaining the Continuation War is notoriously difficult. She
claimed that the Finnish choice has been to examine the ContinuationWar almost
solely as an effect of the Winter War, which obscures the overall consequences
of Finland’s political decision to ally with Germany. Sana argues that the Finnish
authorities knew what had been going on in Germany since the mid-1930s but
decided pragmatically to look the other way. And, in Finland, as was the case in
Nazi Germany, since antisemitism was virtually impossible to distinguish from
anti-Communism (although this termwouldnot have beenused), anti-Communist
policies in the war led in practice to antisemitic actions (L. Kekkonen 51–3).
Sana’s revision brought Finland’s history of anti-Communism to bear on its
wartime extradition practices. The struggle against Bolshevism constituted an
integral, commondenominator for cooperation between the Finnish State Police,
the Swedish State Police, and theGestapo. The combinationof being a Communist,
a refugee, and a Jew was fatal in Finland during the Continuation War—in that
very order (Berggren 5; Nikkilä-Kiipula 2003a, 7; 2003b, 4). According to Max
Jakobson, a leading Finnish intellectual, diplomat, and awar veteran himself, who
wrote an extensive review of The Extradited, the cruelties of the Nazi regime and
the violations of international human rightswere silencedwhen Finland followed
Germany into the war. For Jakobson, the crucial new information in Sana’s book
was that in the context of thewar, human rightswere easily abandonedby Finland,
which has often claimed to have been above such actions. Thus, Sana threw one
of the key “driftwood” assertions into question: the claim that Finland had
remained a democratic state and respected human rights despite being in alliance
with a totalitarian state. Jakobsonundermined the answer givenbyPrimeMinister
JukkaRangell toHeinrichHimmler: “Wir habenkeine Judenfrage” [Wedon’t have
a Jewish question]—a reply that ended the allies’ discussion of the status of Jews
with Finnish citizenship, which is generally taken to mark Finland’s unequivocal
protection of “its” Jewish population (Jakobson C5).
In his report to the Finnish government, Heikki Ylikangas supported the
notion that anti-Communismwas the key criterion for the extraditions, suggesting
that there is no evidence that Finland deported or extradited people to Germany
solely on the grounds of race or religion (Ylikangas 7–8, 24–6, 33–6). Ylikangas
proposed several research projects of which the most important was one
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examining all extraditions of both civilians and POWs to Germany during thewar
and to the Soviet Union after the war. The Academy of Finland declared this
proposal for a major research project on the extraditions and deaths of POWs to
be of urgent national importance, not only for historiographical reasons but also
for Finnish culture as a whole and for the openness of political debate and
democracy. Sana’s pressure made an impact: it was the duty of an open and
democratic society to allocate resources to research decisive moments in the
state’s history, even if it revealed uncomfortable information about the past. In
addition to the aforementioned project led by Lars Westerlund, treatment of
POWs, other prisoners, refugees, and their extradition to the Soviet Union after
the war has been brought under focus in recent research, often with criticism
towards Sana’s results (see Kauppala).
But the consequences of The Extradited extended beyond a revision of the
framework for interpreting the Continuation War; they touched on the deeper
role that anti-Communismhas played in the Finnishhistorical self-understanding.
The struggle against Communismhas beenpart of Finland’s official ideology since
the early years of independence: in Finland, a brick in the wall against
Communism, the threat of Communismcould beused to justify extrememeasures.
A consequenceof this harsh ideological stancewas that leftismcouldbedemonized
and Communists could be dehumanized, left without the protection of human
rights (see Harle 159–86; Browning 129–39).
Sana’s impact was recognized with the publication of The Extradited. Rony
Smolar, the autobiographer of Abraham Stiller (who actively resisted the
extradition of Jewish refugees in 1942), wrote forthrightly that “it is to be hoped
that the Finnish authorities will now face facts they have ignored since the end
of thewar” (A5). JörnDonner, a Swedish PartyMP and a former Social Democratic
Party MEP, said that there are various black holes in Finland’s past and denying
them is why he sometimes feels sick in Finland (4). Later, Green Party MP Irina
Krohn declared that the dark sides of Finland’s historymust be revealed and that
the genocide of European Jewry must not be forgotten—especially now [in 2004]
when the EU was attempting to create a new, humane constitution for itself.
Krohn also claimed that “one of the key elements of national identity, the
Continuation War, has been made into mush, according to which Finland has
always only tried to do the honorable thing” (16). To Professor Jukka Kekkonen,
The Extradited had touched a sore spot in Finnish history, which has mainly tried
to legitimate the success story of a small country surviving in the tumult of world
politics; writing history in Finland, it is more common and more applauded to
write books that praise great men than to conduct critical research into their
actions (8). This opinionwas shared by the historian Jari Sedergren, who pointed
out that it is precisely the political task of critical historiography also to remember
the dark sides of the past (Hirvasnoro 7; Sedergren).
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At the Tieto-Finlandia award ceremony, journalist HannuTaanila, who chose
The Extradited for the prize, remarked that The Extradited had provoked “typical
hooray-nationalistmumbo-jumbo” from those peoplewho think that “one should
not pry into things that one should not pry into.” He suggested that the belief
that Finland is never awilling agent but a “virgo semper immaculate” is extremely
useful for certain purposes: it relieves Finland of responsibility, both politically
and, more importantly, morally. His comments were echoed two weeks later by
the President of Finland, Tarja Halonen, at a ceremony on Holocaust Victims’
International Day of Commemoration. Referring to The Extradited, she said that
the time seemed ripe for a critical examination of the issue since it was “vital for
national self-esteem that its collective mind is not traumatized by unsettled
issues.” This reexamination is especially “important now, when signs of racism
and antisemitism are becoming more visible all the time” (Halonen 2004).
Manipulation and Poppycock: Conservatives Strike Back
Elina Sana’s political connection between Finland and the Holocaust was
criticized by conservative media and researchers whose results The Extradited
questioned. Even before official publication of the book, Hannu Rautkallio
proclaimed that The Extradited could not contain new information since the
material used for its writing was available in different archives to anyone who
bothered to look. Rautkallio’s own studies, based mainly on official documents
on Jews in Finland during the SecondWorldWar, make a strong claim that, apart
from the eight refugees who were deported in 1942 (many of whom had earlier
criminal convictions), the rest of the refugees as well as the Finnish Jews were
saved from the Holocaust. None of the Finnish Jews were deported; moreover,
many took part in Finland’s alliancewith Germany, a sign of their security within
the Finnish state. Rautkallio also claimed that Jewish POWs were treated
exceptionallywell in comparison to other prisoners, precisely because theywere
kept separate, held in their own group with privileges relating, for example, to
religious practices. Consequently, Rautkallio stated that there are only speculative
reasons why Jewish POWs were concentrated in certain camps in 1941–1942
(Pärssinen 2003c, 6; see also Rautkallio 1987; 1994; 2004a; 2008).8 Finnish Jews did
fight on the same side with Germany and were protected from the impact of the
racial policies of the Nazis; nonetheless, it is not hard to imagine what
consequenceswould have emerged for themhad the Third Reich been victorious.
The latest academic research has shown that these Jews and political prisoners,
contrary to Rautkallio’s claims, were not privileged. In contrast, prisoners of
Finnic background (for example Ingrians andKarelians)were located in a separate
campwithbetter conditions and treatment than Jews, Cossacks, andRussians—who
were at the bottom of the hierarchy (Suolahti 153-4).
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The more serious effort to discredit Sana’s accounts was the argument that
she intentionally connected Finland to the Holocaust. For Rautkallio, the first and
most important research question should be why no more people had been deported
or extradited fromFinland during the SecondWorldWar, and notwhy those specific
individuals were extradited. Rautkallio implies that the value of a human being can
be measured in quantity, that the fate of those deported or extradited is
overshadowed by the majority of those who were not; he criticizes Sana for
associating Finland with the Holocaust without understanding the historical
reality of the time. Sana’s interpretationof the criteria of extraditions—Jewishness,
Communism, and their mixture—was simply ignored by Rautkallio, who insisted
there was no documentary proof of anyone being extradited due to ethnicity.
Rautkallio concluded that Sana clearly had selected her material to support her
a priori aims in order to drag Finland into the sphere of all-European collective
guilt for the Holocaust. In this sense, as Rautkallio proclaimed, Sana resembled
David Irving.9 Finally, Rautkallio claimed that The Extradited had been published
exactly at the right time for the Wiesenthal Centre because the Centre seemed
to have run out of targets (Rautkallio 2004b, 33-4).
If, as Rautkallio and others suggested, Finnish cooperationwith the Gestapo
was yesterday’s news, then the furor aroused by The Extradited reveals the
involvement of the history establishment in history politics.10 A journalist by
profession, Elina Sanamade explicit her suspicion of establishedhistoriographers
in several public comments, suggesting that the extraditions and co-operation
with theNazis hadbeen a topic academichistorianshad avoided. Inher acceptance
speech for the Tieto-Finlandia prize she suggested that “this book has touched
some kind of crucial nerve of Finnishness: people have sent me mountains of
emails, letters, flowers, and their own writing on the topic, and some journalists
have even started to conduct local research on extraditions and POWs,” implying
that academic accounts of the past have detached themselves from reality and
from people’s own memories of what actually happened (Sana 2004b; Kotkamaa
12).
The Extradited, then, touched on many crucial themes: antisemitism,
anti-Communism, the role of official Finland in the Continuation War alliance,
the impact of the war on the Finnish national self-conception, the role of
professional historians in preserving a specific vision of the state. Surprisingly,
in the patriotic fervor of the post-Soviet era, Sanawas also seen as part of another
troubling narrative of Finland’s past, not the wartime alliance but as a remnant
of the Finlandization era of self-blame and mortification. While the leftist
newspapers, such as Kansan Uutiset and Uutispäivä Demari, emphasized the
importance of Sana’s results, the overtly rightist andmoderate presswas farmore
suspicious, discrediting Sana as a human rights activist and a left-wing writer.
Nykypäivä, the newspaper of the right-wing National Coalition Party, described
The Extradited as an example of misleading “Holocaust fiction” (Hirvasnoro 7;
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Bamberg 18; Virmavirta 12). In other papers, it was branded as “political,”
“outrageously biased,” “a political pamphlet,” “subjective,” “leftist,” “purposeful,”
“a jumble of fact and fiction,” “manipulative,” and “poppycock” (Turtola 24;
“Tieto-Finlandia-palkinnon,” 4.) Moreover, Nykypäivä demanded thewithdrawal
of the Tieto-Finlandia prize because Elina Sana’s “political pamphlet” had beaten
out proper research.11 Sana, it was alleged, was idolizing those who had fought
on the Red side during the Civil War of 1918 and were later imprisoned during
the Second World War, although they were clearly “minions of foreign powers”
(Virmavirta 12). It seemed to her critics that Sana had forgotten that Finlandwas
at war against the communism of the Soviet Union. It was also claimed that
Ylikangas’s proposal to start several research projects was the least he could do,
but luckily “the mafia behind Elina Sana did not fully have its way” (Virmavirta
12; Puuperä 68). In addition, colonel Jukka Suviniemi proclaimed that “Sana’s and
Taanila’s biaswas understandable based on their previous actions,” but the colonel
was astonished since it seemed to him that Ylikangas had tactically not
acknowledged the existing information regarding the extraditions (for example
research byOhtoManninen) in order to receive governmental funding for “certain
research projects” (Suviniemi 4). Sana’s book, then, was seen by the right as part
of a long-term, communist-inflected effort to undermine the consensual—and
correct—understanding of Finland in the Second World War. History should be
left to the specialists, and amateurs should not intervene in order to “manipulate
the past”; a left-wing perspective automatically denotes being dubiously,
unacceptably “political.”12
In general, the debate on The Extradited reflects all the main themes of this
article, spanning fromacross all the decades since the end ofWWII. First, it shows
in its part how the Holocaust discussion in Finland is intimately bound to the
larger discussion of Finland in World War II. Second, interpretations of Finland’s
relation to theHolocaust are essentially connected to the real and imagined threat
of Communism, often resulting with a focus on finding out the exact number of
victims instead of discussing human rights and political choices. Third, although
nowadays a fair amount of critical Finnish research exists, it has quite often been
initiatives either from abroad or outside academia that have functioned as
catalysts—and received a large amount of criticism.
NOTES
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are our own.
2. Edwin Linkomies was appointed as Prime Minister for the purpose of disengaging
Finland from the war. In 1944 Linkomies’s government negotiated for peace twice but
on both occasions deemed that the conditions set by the Soviet Union were too harsh.
Instead, President Risto Ryti and Linkomies decided to accept German help and thus
enhanced Finland’s ties to Germany. After themassive Soviet counteroffensive in 1944
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Linkomies (and Ryti) resigned, and thus the new government led by Antti Hackzell
could start fresh negotiations for detaching Finland from the war.
3. Finnlandisierung (lit. “to become or to be made like Finland”) is a concept originally
used inGermandebates of the 1950s and 1960s to criticize policies thatwere extensively
pro-Soviet Union.
4. In a survey conducted in October 2008 by Helsingin Sanomat, 16 out of 28 Finnish
professors of history held the opinion that Finland was Germany’s ally, whereas six
professors saw Finland as having waged a separate war. Six professors did not give a
clear answer (Mäkinen C1).
5. This section of the article is based on Tilli’s chapter “Elina Sana’s Luovutetut and the
Politics of History” originally published inHanaWorthen and SimoMuir (eds.), Finland’s
Holocaust. Silences of History (New York: Palgrave, 2013), 151–172. It is reproduced here
with the permission of Palgrave Macmillan.
6. Sana speculated that the number extraditedmight be between 78 and 129, underlining
the impossible task of giving both an exact number of those extradited and an exact
account of the State Police [Valpo] and its collaborative operations since essential
documents from the Valpo archives were deliberately destroyed in the aftermath of
the Soviet offensive in the summer of 1944.
7. The report of theproject is available online in English at http://www.arkisto.fi/uploads/
Palvelut/Julkaisut/POW%20deaths_web.pdf.
8. There seems to be a personal dimension in the strife between Rautkallio and Sana as
well. Hannu Rautkallio was annoyed by Sana's omission of his own research from her
sources; under attack, Sana responded that Rautkallio's own initial research on the
topic (in 1985) plagiarized her award-winning 1979 study. See Sana 2004a.
9. Irving (b. 1938) is an English author focusing on Nazi Germany. He has been shown to
have deliberately manipulated historical evidence in order to promote Holocaust
denial, particularly pertaining to Adolf Hitler’s role in the Holocaust.
10. Rautkallio's criticism of Sana's workwas supported by counsellor and historian Ilmari
Laukkonen who stated that Hannu Rautkallio's arguments were “so convincing and
the issue in question so familiar to him that there is no hesitation that his assessment
would not be on the mark.” In addition, Laukkonen proclaimed that despite all the
commotionone truth remained: theworldwouldnot becomebetter by delving in “old,
difficult crises” (Laukkonen 2).
11. Interestingly, Professor Jukka Kekkonen stated that The Extradited is research that
fulfils academic requirements and that it is extremely difficult to reject it based on
such criteria (J. Kekkonen 8).
12. Heikki Ylikangas's report also provoked criticism. Professor Ohto Manninen from the
National Defence University repeated in several newspapers the above-mentioned
argument that Ylikangas also fails to mention the fact that information about the
extraditions had been available to both researchers and the general public for some
time. In particular, Manninen mentions his own 1994 article in the History of the
Continuation War anthology. He felt that his article should have been mentioned in
Ylikangas's list of references. Thus The Extraditedwas considered not to have revealed
138 SCANDINAVIAN-CANADIAN STUDIES/ÉTUDES SCANDINAVES AU CANADA
anythingnew, especially to those researcherswhose results Sana challenged (Manninen
2004a, 4; 2004b, A5).
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